When Iran defeated the USA
The Story of the Diplomatic Game Between Iran and the United States at the France '98 World Cup
Lyon, June 21, 1998.
At the Stade de Gerland, the fourth match of Group F has just concluded.
Swiss referee Urs Meier has blown the final whistle, and the scoreboard displays a stunning verdict.
Iran 2 - 1 United States.
The Iranian players are euphoric, as photographers from around the globe capture a moment destined for the history books—and not just the sporting ones.
What unfolded that evening wasn't just a football upset. It was a pivotal act in a geopolitical drama that had been playing out for decades.
At that moment, a full 18 years had passed since the two countries had severed diplomatic relations. Eighteen years in which hostile rhetoric had defined their relationship, with Iran labelling the USA as the "Great Satan" and Washington including Tehran among its "rogue states."
The match between Iran and the United States was never going to be just a football game. It was immediately dubbed "the mother of all games."
It was the history of the late 20th century, condensed into 90 minutes.
The Shah's Iran: Washington's Ally in the Gulf
Today, we take it for granted that the United States and Iran are enemies, but it wasn’t always so. And the era when Washington and Tehran were allies isn't even that far in the past.
After World War II, Iran was a constitutional monarchy with a democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mossadeq. In 1951, he nationalized the oil industry, which until then had been controlled by the British.
This decision, seen as a threat in the midst of the Cold War, prompted the CIA and Britain's MI6 to orchestrate the 1953 coup d'état known as Operation Ajax. The coup deposed Mossadeq and consolidated the absolute power of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
Under the Shah, Iran became Washington's "gendarme of the Persian Gulf." The United States supplied billions of dollars in advanced weaponry, while American companies gained privileged access to Iranian oil.
However, behind the facade of a powerful, rapidly modernising nation, deep cracks were forming that would eventually lead to the regime's downfall. The popular discontent wasn't rooted in a single cause, but in an explosive mix of economic, cultural, and political factors.
It's a common exercise in our social media age—where armchair analysts try to dissect complex issues in 90 seconds—to post videos of Iran from the '60s and '70s. These clips show women in Western clothing, without veils, in a society that seems to resemble our own.
This oversimplifies the message, suggesting that Iran under the Pahlavi reign was just like us, and therefore better. Such an attempt to explain a country as complex as Iran is, frankly, ridiculous. But we can leave that to those who get their information from Instagram Reels. The readers of this newsletter, however, know how to handle complexity.
The so-called "White Revolution" of the 1960s, an ambitious program of land and social reforms, uprooted millions of peasants from the countryside. It pushed them into underserved shantytowns on the outskirts of cities, creating a new class of urban poor.
The 1970s oil boom, rather than easing the problem, exacerbated it. The immense wealth it generated fueled rampant corruption and runaway inflation that devastated the purchasing power of the lower-middle classes. All the while, a Westernised elite tied to the court flaunted a lifestyle of obscene luxury and distance.
Compounding this was a profound sense of cultural alienation. The Shah's push for a top-down, Western-style modernisation felt forced and superficial, offending the religious and traditional sensibilities of much of the population.
Events like the lavish 1971 celebration of the Persian Empire's 2,500th anniversary at Persepolis, which cost hundreds of millions of dollars, were seen as an insult to both Islamic sobriety and the reality of widespread poverty.
Politically, any form of dissent was brutally crushed by the feared secret police, the SAVAK, which had been trained by the CIA and Israeli Mossad. Prisons were filled with political dissidents, torture was systematic, and there was no freedom of the press or association. This climate of terror stripped the Shah of all legitimacy and transformed the Shiite clergy, led from exile by Ayatollah Khomeini, into the only organised and credible voice of opposition for the masses.
When mass protests erupted in 1978, the Shah found himself surprisingly isolated, even on the international stage. His most powerful ally, the United States, was led by Jimmy Carter, an administration that had made human rights a cornerstone of its foreign policy.
This created a debilitating conflict within Washington. On one side, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski urged unconditional support for the Shah, encouraging an iron-fist response. On the other, the State Department, led by Cyrus Vance, pressed for moderation and reforms to appease the opposition.
These conflicting signals left the Shah confused and paralyzed. Sick with cancer (a state secret at the time) and psychologically dependent on American backing, he hesitated, alternating between belated concessions and brutal crackdowns, like the "Black Friday" of September 1978, when the army fired on protesters in Tehran, killing hundreds.
Meanwhile, American intelligence dramatically underestimated the strength of the revolutionary movement and Khomeini's charisma. They believed until the very end that the Shah could maintain control or be replaced by a moderate military or civilian government.
Deprived of clear and decisive support from Washington and unable to grasp the depth of his people's rejection, the Shah was overwhelmed. In January 1979, he left for what was officially called a "vacation," but was, in reality, an exile with no return.
The Islamic Revolution
The Shah's departure in January 1979 didn't leave a power vacuum; it ignited a struggle to fill one. The transitional government, led by the secular nationalist Shapour Bakhtiar, never stood a chance. It was seen as the last, feeble attempt of the old regime to survive.
The real power was in the streets, and its ideological center of gravity was in Neauphle-le-Château, France, where Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was orchestrating the opposition.
His return to Tehran on February 1, 1979, was met by a jubilant crowd of millions, marking the end of 2,500 years of Persian monarchy. In less than two months, a referendum saw an overwhelming majority (over 98%) vote for the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It was a theocracy founded on the complex principle of Velayat-e Faqih (the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), which entrusted the state's supreme leadership to a religious scholar: Khomeini himself.
On October 22, 1979, President Carter, yielding to both humanitarian and political pressure, allowed the exiled and ailing Shah into the United States for cancer treatment.
In Iran, the news was a spark in a powder keg. The memory of the 1953 CIA-backed coup that had reinstalled the Shah was still vivid, and many interpreted Carter's move as a prelude to another American plot to overthrow the revolution.
On November 4, 1979, a group of radical students scaled the walls of the American embassy in Tehran, taking 52 people hostage. While Khomeini had not directly ordered the attack, he quickly endorsed it, calling it "the second revolution."
The Ayatollah used the crisis with extraordinary strategic skill. It served to shatter the credibility of the moderate provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan, who had met with American officials just days before and was forced to resign. It also rallied the entire nation behind Khomeini's own intransigent leadership.
The crisis lasted 444 days. It not only led to the formal severing of diplomatic relations in April 1980 but also cemented the United States' role as the "Great Satan" in Iran's official ideology—the source of arrogance, imperialism, and moral corruption in the world. For Washington, Iran became the symbol of a hostile and unpredictable extremism, setting the stage for decades of sanctions, mistrust, and conflict.
The Miracle of Melbourne
Seventeen years after the break in diplomatic relations, Iran was on the verge of qualifying for its first World Cup since 1978. Its path was a dramatic one. After losing the Asian playoff to Japan, Iran had one last chance: an intercontinental playoff against Australia. The first leg in Tehran ended 1-1, a result that heavily favored the Australians.
On November 29, 1997, at the Melbourne Cricket Ground, a crowd of 85,000 watched as Australia took a commanding 2-0 lead. Qualification seemed to be in their hands. But with about 15 minutes left, the unthinkable happened. A notorious Australian pitch invader named Peter Hore stormed the field and damaged one of the nets, causing a delay of several minutes.
That pause completely changed the game's momentum. It shattered Australia's rhythm and gave Iran crucial time to regroup. Immediately after play resumed, Iran scored two goals in quick succession from Karim Bagheri and Khodadad Azizi. The 2-2 final score, on the away goals rule, sent Iran to the World Cup.
The streets of Tehran erupted in an unprecedented celebration, a rare moment of collective joy in a country isolated and worn down by years of war and sanctions.
"When Iran qualified for the World Cup by beating Australia in Melbourne, the entire country celebrated. People were dancing in the streets of Tehran, drinking alcohol, and women were taking off their headscarves. The Revolutionary Guards did nothing because they were happy too. They were football fans first, Revolutionary Guards second."
Mehrdad Masoudi
The Diplomatic Game
The draw for France '98 felt like a twist of fate: Iran and the United States were placed in the same group, alongside Yugoslavia and Germany. The game was immediately dubbed "the mother of all games," and the tension was sky-high.
Iranian authorities were obsessed with security and public image. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had initially forbidden the players from walking toward the Americans for the traditional pre-match handshake. However, FIFA had designated Iran as "Team B," which meant that, according to regulations, they were required to approach their opponents.
Furthermore, Iranian intelligence feared a public demonstration by the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), an exiled opposition group then considered a terrorist organization by both Iran and the US. The MEK had reportedly bought thousands of tickets to the match.
"We received intelligence on who these saboteurs were. We gave photos to the television cameramen so they would know which people and which banners to avoid. The match was being broadcast all over the world, and the last thing we wanted was for this group to sabotage the occasion and use it for their own political agenda."
Mehrdad Masoudi
To overcome the diplomatic impasse of the handshake and send a message of peace, the Iranian players came onto the field carrying bouquets of white roses—a symbol of peace in Iran—and presented them to their American counterparts. The gesture dissolved the tension. The two teams posed together for a historic photograph, an image of unity that resonated around the world.
The match was hard-fought. In the 40th minute, Hamid Estili scored the opener with a magnificent looping header that sailed over the American goalkeeper Kasey Keller—a goal that remains legendary in Iran.
With six minutes remaining, Mehdi Mahdavikia doubled the lead on a swift counter-attack. Three minutes later, Brian McBride pulled one back for the States, but it was too late.
The defeat eliminated the United States from the tournament. Despite the bitter relations between Washington and Tehran, the players exchanged jerseys at the final whistle in a climate of mutual respect. For Iran, this was far more than a sports victory; it was a moment of immense national pride that, for one night, seemed to change the narrative between two enemy nations.
Conclusion
The words of US defender Jeff Agoos were emblematic:
"We did more in 90 minutes than the politicians did in 20 years!"
Unfortunately, it is crucial to stress, as I always do in this newsletter, that football—and sport in general—does not have the power to change relations between countries.
Sport follows, it doesn't lead. It arrives on the scene only after administrations have already decided to improve relations. Ping-pong diplomacy is a case in point. It is often hailed as the architect of the thaw in US-China relations, but it came after the two governments had already decided to talk.
And so it proved here. 27 years after that match, relations between Iran and the United States have reached their lowest point ever, and the two countries are at war.
Sources:
https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-relations-iran-1953-2025
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/shah-supreme-leader
https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/world-cup-iran-united-states-mujahedin-khalq
Even as a child watching that I sensed the significance (and thoroughly enjoyed it!)